18 March 1971
RA Burrows Saq CMG
British High Commission
Islamabad
THE SITUATION IN EAST PAKISTAN
1. With the much vaunted and long awaited talks between the President and Mujib still in progress, it is no time to speculate about their likely outcome. It remains, however, that it is improbable that a meeting of the National Assembly on 25 March would serve any fruitful purpose in the present climate, for even if a conciliation between the President and the Awami League can be arranged, a huge gulf separates Mujib from Bhutto.
2. But while there are innumerable theoretical solutions to a wide variety of political problems, there are, too, certain unpalatable conclusions to be drawn from the events of the past two weeks. These have an immediate, as well as a long term, bearing on the future of East Pakistan.
3. Firstly, the Awani League leadership, even if surprised by the speed with which it assumed some measure of political authority, has shown itself to be incapable of acting prudently and consistently. Its directives, especially those dealing with economic matters, have been muddled and incomplete, almost daily in need of alteration. The Party itself has demonstrated that it has a leader, but not an organisation or hierarchy, and so far it has declined even to equip itself with the fundamental necesities of any infant bureaucracy. Perhaps the quality of its decisions and organisation would improve if it enjoyed the benefit of advice from the Civil Service (which, of course, has been on strike since 1 March); but bearing in mind the calibre of those in the upper echelons of the Awami League this must remain highly problematical.
4. Secondly, there are disquieting signs that the students are beginning to take a more active and extremist line. The so-called Bangla Desh Chhattra Sangram Parishad embraces not only the East Pakistan Students League but also the Dacca University Central Students Union. If only because of the successes enjoyed by earlier student activists, this body is in a position to exert real pressure on events, should Mujib fail to call the correct tune. It has already introduced roadside checks, until told to desist by Mujib, after at least one death and several cases of severe injury. Responsible Bengalis fear that if there is a reversion to student control, as happened in 1968 in the days of Tofail Ahmed, no one's property or livelihood will be safe.
5. Thirdly, the delicate but nascent infrastructure of foreign aid and technical assistance programmes has been dealt a mortal blow by the departure of the entire World Bank teams, and all Japanese and German experts. This has produced no comment in the Press, save pronouncements to the effect that the Awami League wishes foreigners to remain in Bangladesh. It is too early to predict precisely what will be the consequences of this large scale departure; but certainly it must have a deleterious and severe impact on East Pakistan's future economic prospects over the short term anyhow, and there are no indications that those who have left intend to return soon.
6. Already, the financial and economic situation here has become extremely precarious. A combination of civil disobedience, strikes and Awami League directives has caused a serious loss of productivity and deep concern in banking and business circles. Traders and businessmen have found that their bills are not, or cannot be settled, whilst at the same time they are expected to pay out substantial sums in wages. (Duncan Brothers, for example, are owed Rs.62 lakhs for tea already sold and partly shipped to West Pakistan by the "buyers".) Bankers who have given credit on the security of mills or factories, now fear that they will be unable to redeem their loans. The East Pakistani economy is very much a deficit financed one, and in the present climate no further investment is likely for the foreseeable future, and those concerns in the hands of West Pakistanis are vulnerable to civil turbulence and labour trouble. The picture is gloomier now than ever it was; and it is difficult at present to imagine how a recovery can be effected, or who would be capable of making the attempt.
7. Fourthly, there is a very real danger that in the disguise of an ardently nationalist movement, East Bengal will find itself on the narrow and slippery path which leads to anarchy. There is much wild talk about "communist" take overs and the expansion of the Naxalite movement in East Bengal; there is scant evidence that this is really so. What is apparent is that the economic and social pressures here are so great as to drive Bengalis into acts of savage but unpremeditated violence. At the moment, and in the absence of evidence to the contrary, I am prepared to dismiss suggestions that this violence is the result of an acquaintance with the thoughts of Mao or the writings of Marx; but the events of the past weeks have demonstrated conclusively that East Bengal is likely to become an even less safe place to live in than it was before. Miles' letter of 3 March (not to all) describing efforts by the Army in West Bengal to stamp out in concert with the local police lawlessness there forces the thought that, without the presence of an active military force in East Bengal, the situation here could deteriorate rapidly, for neither the Police nor the East Pakistan Rifles can be characterised as resolute or authoritative, and the mobs can be raised to vast proportions and are of wild irresponsibility and violence.
8. These general conclusions will make depressing reading. They reflect the extent to which we believe that the recent political disturbances have altered the future outlook for East Pakistan. It may be that all that can be done will be to extricate remaining British interests in commerce and industry as painlessly as possible, but we shall have time to think about this.
9. I am copying this letter to Ian Sutherland in South Asian Department, to John Moberley at Washington, and to Karachi, Lahore and Polad Singapore.
Rediscovering the Bangladesh Liberation War through Unexplored Archives
Writing the history of war, especially the history of a liberation war, is one of the most challenging tasks for historians. The Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971 was no exception. Faced with the loss, destruction, or restricted access to potential archives, historians grapple with the task of finding alternative sources, often turning to oral histories.
Several significant archives for filling the gaps in documents related to the liberation war of Bangladesh are located overseas. Among these, the National Archives in the UK stands out as one of the most crucial resources. During the Summer and Fall of 2023, I had the opportunity to visit the National Archives at Kew Gardens in the UK and conduct around two months of archival research. The documents pertaining to the Bangladesh Liberation War are preserved under the Department of Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). Some of these documents, declassified most recently, remain largely unexplored by historians of the Bangladesh Liberation War. The materials from the National Archives, UK provide valuable insights into both internal and external developments related to the Liberation War of Bangladesh.
I am grateful for the generous funding provided by the McGill University Mobility Award and the Schull Yang International Experience Award, which supported my archival research. Additionally, I extend my thanks to my hosts, Rubayet Sharmin and Razin Khan, in London.
Azizul Rasel, PhD Student at McGill University, Canada.
